# PACSystems™ RX3i

PROFINET I/O DEVICES
SECURE DEPLOYMENT GUIDE

**EMERSON.**

# Contents

# Chapter 1:   About this Guide

This document provides information that can be used to help improve the cyber security of systems that include PROFINET I/O devices from Emerson. It is intended for use by control engineers, integrators, IT professionals, and developers responsible for deploying and configuring PROFINET I/O products.

Secure deployment information is provided in this manual for the following products supplied by Emerson.

| Family | Catalog Number | Description |
|---|---|---|
| PACSystems RX3i | IC695PNS001 | RX3i PROFINET Scanner module |
| PACSystems RX3i | IC695PNS101 | RX3i Advanced PROFINET Scanner module. |
| PACSystems RX3i | IC695CEP001 | CEP PROFINET Scanner module. |
| PACSystems RX3i | IC695GCG001 | Genius Communications Gateway |

## 1.1     Revisions in this Manual

| Rev | Date | Description |
|---|---|---|
| E | Sep 2019 | Following Emerson's acquisition of this product, changes have been made to apply appropriate branding and registration of the product with required certification agencies. No changes to material, process, form, fit or functionality. |
| D | Jul-2018 | Updated for IC695PNS101, IC695CEP001. |
| C | Feb-2017 | Updated for replacement IC695PNS001 (-Bxxx implementation). |
| B | Jun-2016 | Updated Internet Layer Protocolstable to include IGMP |
| A | Jul-2014 | Added section 5.2, Genius Gateway.<br>Updated diagram to include Genius Gateway. |

# 1.2 PACSystems Documentation

## PACSystems Manuals

| | |
|---|---|
| PACSystems RX7i, RX3i and RSTi-EP CPU Reference Manual | GFK-2222 |
| PACSystems RX7i, RX3i and RSTi-EP CPU Programmer's Reference Manual | GFK-2950 |
| PACSystems RX7i, RX3i and RSTi-EP TCP/IP Ethernet Communications User Manual | GFK-2224 |
| PACSystems TCP/IP Ethernet Communications Station Manager User Manual | GFK-2225 |
| PACSystems Machine Edition Logic Developer Getting Started | GFK-1918 |
| PACSystems Process Systems Getting Started Guide | GFK-2487 |
| PACSystems RXi, RX3i, RX7i and RSTi-EP Controller Secure Deployment Guide | GFK-2830 |
| PACSystems RX3i & RSTi-EP PROFINET I/O Controller Manual | GFK-2571 |

## RX3i Manuals

| | |
|---|---|
| PACSystems RX3i System Manual | GFK-2314 |
| PACSystems RX3i PROFINET Scanner Manual | GFK-2737 |
| PACSystems RX3i CEP PROFINET Scanner User Manual | GFK-2883 |
| PACSystems RX3i Serial Communications Modules User's Manual | GFK-2460 |
| PACSystems RX3i Genius Communications Gateway User Manual | GFK-2892 |
| PACSystems RX3i DNP3 Outstation Module IC695EDS001 User's Manual | GFK-2911 |
| PACSystems RX3i IEC 104 Server Module IC695EIS001User's Manual | GFK-2949 |

## Field Agent Manuals

| | |
|---|---|
| Field Agents User Guide | GFK-2993 |
| Field Agents Upgrade Guide | GFK-3017 |

In addition to these manuals, datasheets and product update documents describe individual modules and product revisions. The most recent PACSystems documentation is available on the Emerson support website https://www.emerson.com/Industrial-Automation-Controls/support.

# Chapter 2:   Introduction

This section introduces the fundamentals of security and secure deployment.

## 2.1     Security

Security is the process of maintaining the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a system:

- Confidentiality: Ensure only the people you want to see information are those who can see it.

- Integrity: Ensure the data is what it is supposed to be.

- Availability: Ensure the system or data is available for use.

Emerson recognizes the importance of building and deploying products with these concepts in mind and encourages customers to take appropriate care in securing their Emerson products and solutions.

As Emerson product vulnerabilities are discovered and fixed, security advisories are issued to describe each vulnerability in a product version as well as the version in which the vulnerability was fixed. Emerson Product Security Advisories can be found at the following location: https://www.emerson.com/Industrial-Automation-Controls/support.

## 2.2     Firewall

Firewalls and other network security products, including Data Diodes and Intrusion Prevention Devices, can be an important component of any security strategy. However, a strategy based solely on any single security mechanism will not be as resilient as one that includes multiple, independent layers of security.

Therefore, Emerson recommends taking a Defense in Depth approach to security.

## 2.3     Defense in Depth

Defense in Depth is the concept of using multiple, independent layers of security to raise the cost and complexity of a successful attack. To carry out a successful attack on a system, an attacker would need to find not just a single exploitable vulnerability but would need to exploit vulnerabilities in each layer of defense that protects an asset.

For example, if a system is protected because it is on a network protected by a firewall, the attacker only needs to circumvent the firewall to gain unauthorized access. However, if there is an additional layer of defense, for example, a username/password authentication requirement, now the attacker needs to find a way to circumvent both the firewall and the username/password authentication.

## 2.4 General Recommendations

Adopting the following security best practices should be considered when using Emerson products and solutions.

- The PROFINET I/O Devices covered in this document were not designed for or intended to be connected directly to any wide area network, including but not limited to a corporate network or the Internet at large. Additional routers and firewalls (such as those illustrated in Figure 1: Reference Architecture) that have been configured with access rules customized to the site's specific needs must be used to access devices described in this document from outside the local control networks. If a control system requires external connectivity, care must be taken to control, limit and monitor all access, using, for example, virtual private networks (VPN) or Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) architectures.

- Harden system configurations by enabling/using the available security features, and by disabling unnecessary ports, services, functionality, and network file shares.

- Apply all the latest product security updates from Emerson, SIMs, and other recommendations.

- Apply all the latest operating system security patches to control systems computers.

- Use anti-virus software on control systems computers and keep the associated anti-virus signatures up-to-date.

- Use whitelisting software on control systems computers and keep the whitelist up-to-date.

## 2.5 Checklist

This section provides a sample checklist to help guide the process of securely deploying PROFINET I/O products.

1. Create or locate a network diagram.

2. Identify and record the required communication paths between nodes.

3. Identify and record the protocols required along each path, including the role of each node. (Refer to Chapter 3:, Communication Requirements.)

4. Revise the network as needed to ensure appropriate partitioning, adding firewalls or other network security devices as appropriate. Update the network diagram. (Refer to Chapter 6:, Network Architecture and Secure Deployment.)

5. Configure firewalls and other network security devices. (Refer to Section 3.4, Ethernet Firewall Configuration and Chapter 6:, Network Architecture and Secure Deployment.)

6. Enable and/or configure the appropriate security features on each PROFINET I/O Device. (Refer to Chapter 4:, Security Capabilities.)

7. On each PROFINET I/O Device, change every supported password to something other than its default value. (Refer to Section 4.4, Password Management.)

8. Harden the configuration of each PROFINET I/O Device, disabling unneeded features, protocols and ports. (Refer to Chapter 5:, Configuration Hardening.)

9. Test/qualify the system.

10. Create an update/maintenance plan.

> *Note:* *Secure deployment is only one part of a robust security program. This document, including the checklist above, is limited to providing secure deployment guidance only. For more information about security programs in general, refer to Section 7.3, Additional Guidance.*

# Chapter 3:   Communication Requirements

Communication between different parts of a control system is, and must be, supported. However, the security of a control system can be enhanced by limiting the protocols allowed, and the paths across which they are allowed, to only what is needed. This can be accomplished by disabling every communication protocol that is not needed on a particular device (refer to Chapter 5:, Configuration Hardening), and by using appropriately configured and deployed network security devices (for example, firewalls and routers) to block every protocol (whether disabled or not) that does not need to pass from one network/segment to another.

Emerson recommends limiting the protocols allowed by the network infrastructure to the minimum set required for the intended application. Successfully doing this requires knowing which protocol is needed for each system-level interaction.

This section describes how the supported serial and Ethernet application protocols are used with PROFINET I/O Devices and indicates the role of each participant in the communication. Lower-level Ethernet protocols are not discussed here but are instead assumed to be supported when needed by the application protocol.

*Note:*    *To support PROFINET communication between two nodes, the network must also support UDP, IP, and ARP in both directions between the nodes.*

*Note:*    *On a PROFINET I/O device, support for these protocols may be provided by a peripheral module (for example, a PROFIBUS or Serial Communications module).*

This information is intended to be used to help guide the specification of the network architecture and to help configure firewalls internal to that network, in order to support only the required communications paths for any installation.

## 3.1      Supported Protocols

### 3.1.1      ETHERNET Protocols

This section indicates which Ethernet protocols are supported, and by which PROFINET I/O Devices. Note that some of the supported protocols may not be required in a given system, since the installation may only be using a subset of the available protocols.

## Supported ETHERNET Protocols

| | Protocol | RX3i | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | IC695CEP001 | IC695PNS001-Axxx | IC695PNS001-BAxx IC695PNS101 | IC695GCG001 |
| Link | ARP | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | LLDP | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Internet | IPv4 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | ICMP | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Transport | TCP | | | ✓ | ✓ |
| | UDP | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Application Layer | DCE/RPC Client | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | DCE/RPC Server | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | PROFINET DCP client | | | | |
| | PROFINET DCP server | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | PROFINET I/O | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | HTTP Server | | | ✓ | |
| | HTTPS Server | | | ✓ | |
| | MRP | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | SNMP v1 server | | | | ✓ |
| | SNMP v2c server | | | | |

## 3.1.2    Serial Protocols

In addition to Ethernet, PROFINET I/O Devices may also support communication over serial ports (USB). The information provided here should be used to help guide the specification of any external security controls required to restrict remote serial access, as well as the specification of any required physical security.

This section indicates which serial protocols are supported, and by which PROFINET I/O Devices. Note that some of the supported protocols may not be required in a given system, since the installation may only be using a subset of the available protocols.

| Protocol | IC695CEP001 | IC695PNS001-Axxx |
|---|---|---|
| SNP Slave[1] | √ | √ |

# 3.2    Service Requests

The Service Request protocol from Emerson is a proprietary, media-independent application protocol that provides access to services of Emerson products. This is the primary protocol used by PAC Machine Edition: Logic Developer – PLC when communicating with a PACSystems CPU. It supports many different operations, including:

- Upload /Download the user application & configuration to the Controller.

- Start/Stop the Controller.

- Read, write, verify, or clear Flash/EEPROM memory.

- Clear Controller memory.

- Gather diagnostic info from a Controller.

- Verify Equality.

- View and, in some cases, set the target Controller's operating parameters: device information, memory usage, date and time, reference points/words, access levels, passwords and OEM key, and sweep information.

- View and optionally clear a log of any faults that have occurred in the Controller. The Service Request protocol is transported over a specific media by encapsulating it within a media-specific protocol. Specifically, SNP is used for transporting it over a serial channel. Almost all SNP transmissions contain at least a portion of a Service Request/Reply embedded within them.

Supporting communication between any two nodes using Service Requests requires that the system support communicating using a media-specific protocol such as SNP between those two nodes.

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[1] SNP functionality may be limited. For example, it may only provide Firmware Update Services.

## 3.2.1 SNP

Firmware Update: The SNP protocol is often used in PROFINET I/O Devices from Emerson to support updating the firmware on products or on an installed module that supports having its firmware updated over the backplane. SNP is used to send Service Requests to a node via a serial connection, and to convey the results back to the client.

| Protocol | WinLoader.exe (Windows® Computer) | I/O Device |
|---|---|---|
| SNP | Master | Slave |

## 3.3 PROFINET

This section describes the communication paths needed to support common operations on a PROFINET network.

## 3.3.1 Installing an I/O Device

Commissioning, adding, or replacing an I/O device requires that the device be assigned a unique name to use on the PROFINET network. Doing this requires supporting the following communication path.

| Protocol | PAC Machine Edition | I/O Device |
|---|---|---|
| PROFINET DCP | Client | Server |

Supporting this path will allow PAC Machine Edition to directly discover all the PROFINET I/O devices that are connected to the same subnet as the computer. (Note that this protocol is not routable.) PAC Machine Edition implements the Client functionality directly from the computer network adapter, so I/O devices must be local to the computer's network adapter. It can then be used to (re-)assign a unique name to the I/O device being installed.

*Note:* *This protocol can also be used to make other modifications to the I/O device, such as assigning a new IP address or resetting it to factory defaults. However, those functions are not generally required when Installing an I/O device.*

## 3.3.2 Network Discovery and Device Identification

PAC Machine Edition can also request information about the devices on a PROFINET network from a PACSystems Controller, and then retrieve additional identification information about each device. This request is sent to the PACSystems Controller using the Service Request protocol (described elsewhere) embedded within the SRTP or SNP protocols. The PACSystems Controller satisfies those requests using the following communication paths.

| Protocol | Local I/O Controller | Remote I/O Controllers and I/O Devices |
|---|---|---|
| DCE/RPC | Client | Server |
| PROFINET DCP | Client | Server |

*Note:*   *No mechanism is provided through this communication path for assigning a name to a new I/O device.*

### 3.3.3   Using an I/O Device

Using PROFINET I/O as part of the control application requires that all the following communication paths be supported throughout the life of the application.

| Protocol | I/O Controller | I/O Devices |
|---|---|---|
| DCE/RPC | Client | Server |
| DCE/RPC | Server | Client |
| PROFINET DCP | Client | Server |
| PROFINET I/O | Bi-directional | Bi-directional |

In addition, if the PROFINET network is configured to support Media Redundancy (which requires a ring physical topology) then the following application protocol must also be supported.

| Protocol | I/O Controller | I/O Device |
|---|---|---|
| MRP | Bi-directional | Bi-directional |

## 3.4   Ethernet Firewall Configuration

Network-based and host-based firewalls should be configured to only allow expected and required network traffic. This section identifies the Ether Types and the TCP/UDP ports used by the protocols supported on PROFINET I/O Devices.

This information should be used to help configure network firewalls, in order to support only the required communications paths for any installation.

*Note:*   *Refer to Figure 1 for a diagram showing firewall placement.*

### 3.4.1   Lower-Level Protocols

Ethernet communication is typically described using four layers, each with its own set of protocols. At the top of that hierarchy is the Application layer. Below the Application layer are the Transport, Internet, and Link layers.

Information on the supported protocols from these three lower layers is summarized here.

### Link Layer Protocols

| Protocol | ETHERNET Type |
|---|---|
| ARP | 0x0806 |
| LLDP | 0x88cc |

### Internet Layer Protocols

| Protocol | ETHERNET Type | IP Protocol # |
|---|---|---|
| IPv4 | 0x0800 | (n/a) |
| ICMP | 0x0800 | 1 |
| IGMP | 0x0800 | 2 |

### Transport Layer Protocols

| Protocol | ETHERNET Type | IP Protocol # |
|---|---|---|
| TCP | 0x0800 | 6 |
| UDP | 0x0800 | 17 |

Each of these lower-level protocols is required by one or more of the Application protocols supported on the PROFINET products.

## 3.4.2 Application Layer Protocols

PROFINET devices can act as a server, responding to requests sent via any of several different protocols. They are also capable of acting as a client, sending requests to other servers using any of several different protocols. The exact set of protocols that are enabled/used will depend on which modules are installed, how they are configured, and the details of the application program that is running.

**Table 1**

| Protocol | Server TCP Port | Destination UDP Port | ETHERNET Type (non-IP protocol) |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCE/RPC | | 34964 on server >1023 on client | |
| HTTP | 80 | | |
| HTTPS | 443 | | |
| PROFINET DCP | | | 0x8892 |
| PROFINET I/O | | | 0x8892 |
| MRP | | | 0x88e3 |
| SNMP v1 | | 161 on server >1023 on client | |

# Chapter 4: Security Capabilities

This section describes the PROFINET I/O Device capabilities and security features of products supplied by Emerson which can be used as part of a defense-in-depth strategy to secure your control system.

## 4.1 Capabilities by Product

This section provides a summary view of the security capabilities supported on each PROFINET module.

**Table 2**

| Security Capability | IC695CEP001 IC695PNS001-AXXX | IC695PNS001-BAxx IC695PNS101 | IC695GCG001 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Predefined set of Subjects and Access Rights | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Plaintext Login | | | |
| Access Control List | | | |
| Firmware Signatures | | ✓ | |

## 4.2 Access Control and Authorization

The Access Control process can be divided into two phases:

Definition: Specifying the access rights for each subject (referred to as Authorization), and Enforcement: Approving or rejecting access requests.

This section describes the Access Control capabilities supported by Emerson PROFINET I/O Devices, which includes its Authorization capabilities.

### 4.2.1 Authorization Framework

Defining the access rights for each subject implies that the system must have some means to identify each subject. The most familiar way this is achieved is by assigning a unique User ID to each person who will access the system.

Emerson PROFINET I/O Devices, however, do not provide such a facility – there is no support for creating User IDs. In many cases, a User ID does not even have to be specified to authenticate on a protocol. In such cases, authorization is based on the functionality being used and the password that is provided for authentication. Nevertheless, the authentication features supported on PROFINET I/O Devices implicitly define a fixed set of subjects, which are identified here.

The subjects defined and supported by each server protocol are indicated in the following table:

**Table 3**

| Transport Medium | Functionality | Application Protocol | Subjects Available |
|---|---|---|---|
| Serial | Firmware Update | SNP Slave | Anonymous |
| Ethernet | Web Server | HTTP | Anonymous |
| | Web Server Firmware Update | HTTP | Firmware Updater |
| | Web Server Password Reset | HTTPS | Anonymous |

## 4.2.2    Specifying Access Rights

For each subject, PROFINET I/O Devices from Emerson provide predefined access rights.

### Predefined Access Rights

Using the SNP Slave Application Protocol to update firmware on a PROFINET I/O Device, the Anonymous Subject is granted the same Service Request PRIV Level as the highest PRIV Level user that currently has no password. This equates to PRIV Level 4 user on PROFINET I/O Devices which allows Write Access to support the Firmware Update Functionality.

### Physical Access

The Web Server Password Reset feature requires physical access to the PROFINET I/O Device to assign the Firmware Updater password.

## 4.2.3    Enforcement

Each of the PROFINET I/O Devices enforces the access rights for the data and services that it provides.

# 4.3    Authentication

PROFINET I/O Devices from Emerson may provide password-based authentication for some, but not all, of its server protocols. For each unauthenticated protocol that is enabled, compensating controls may be needed to satisfy an installation's security requirements.

*Note:*    *The default configuration for all Server protocols except Web Server Firmware Update is for no authentication, or for authentication using well-known default values.*

## 4.3.1 Server Protocols

This section summarizes the authentication mechanisms supported by PROFINET I/O Devices for each protocol. It is important to note that some PROFINET I/O Devices only support a subset of the options listed here. Refer to Section 4.1, Capabilities by Product, for more details.

**Table 4**

| Transport Medium | Functionality | Application Protocol | Subjects Available |
|---|---|---|---|
| Serial | Firmware Update | SNP Slave | None |
| Ethernet | Web Server | HTTP | None |
| | Web Server Firmware Update | HTTP | Firmware Updater |

## 4.3.2 Authentication Supported by the PROFINET Protocol

The PROFINET I/O specification does not define an authentication mechanism and so none is supported on Emerson PROFINET I/O Device PROFINET communications.

## 4.3.3 Plaintext Login

Authentication for a protocol may involve sending a plaintext password to the Server. In some cases, these plaintext passwords cannot be more than seven (7) characters long. When such protocols are required, additional compensating controls may be needed to satisfy an installation's security requirements.

## 4.3.4 Recommendations

Emerson strongly recommends that authentication be used for every enabled protocol that supports authentication, that all default passwords be changed, and that access be appropriately restricted to any computer-based file that includes a plaintext password.

Whenever protocols are used with no authentication mechanism, or when authentication is disabled or relies on sending credentials in plaintext across the network, it is critical to control physical and electronic access to the network to prevent unauthorized messages from being sent and acted upon.

Below are recommended actions to be taken to mitigate the risk of external or internal entities accessing an Industrial Control System (ICS) network and sending unauthorized messages.

### Personnel Security Protection

All individuals with permission to physically access ICS systems should have background checks and be trained in the proper use and maintenance of ICS systems.

### Physical Security Perimeter Protection

All ICS hardware should be placed in locked cabinets, with policies and procedures to restrict access to the key.

1. Network equipment such as switches, routers, firewalls, and Ethernet cabling should be physically protected in locked enclosures such as cabinets or closets with policies and procedures to restrict access to these enclosures.

2. Whenever possible, there should be no physical network path from an ICS network to the Internet. It should not be possible for an attacker to reach an ICS network from any Internet-facing computer.

3. Networks should always be physically segmented as suggested in the Reference Network Architecture diagram (Figure 1) to avoid exposure to ICS networks.

4. Each ICS system asset should be visibly labeled by a unique identifier, with all expected asset identification compiled into an access-controlled list.

## Electronic Security Perimeter Protection

1. All external access to an ICS network should be managed through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) or similar technology leveraging two-factor authentication.

2. Next-Generation Firewalls should be properly configured and deployed at each conduit between physical networks that deny all but the specifically allowed protocol families, source addresses, and destination addresses, and specific application-level commands between the two adjacent networks. For example, a Next-Generation Firewall could prohibit write operations across networks while allowing read operations.

3. If one network node such as a PLC or HMI uses unauthenticated protocols to exchange information or commands with another network node on the same physical network, a Next-Generation Firewall could be deployed between the two network nodes. This Next-Generation Firewall should be configured to explicitly whitelist all expected messages between the two network nodes and deny all other unexpected messages.

4. To detect and alert for unexpected, unauthenticated messages on a given network, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) could be configured and deployed. Consider configuring the IDS to log all events to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system that aggregates all security information on the ICS network.

5. To detect and actively prevent unexpected, unauthenticated messages on a given network from reaching a given network node, an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) could be configured and deployed. Consider configuring the IPS to log all events to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system that aggregates all security information on the ICS network.

6. To limit the impact of the compromise of any single user account, it is recommended to divide administrator privileges into several user accounts, each for its own operational function.

7. To limit the impact of the compromise of any single set of credentials (user name, password) for any ICS equipment, it is recommended to never re-use credentials for different tools or purposes.

8. Carefully protect sources of and access to credentials (user names, passwords) for all ICS equipment, including switches, routers, firewalls, IDS, IPS, etc.

9. Enforce a policy of rotating credentials for ICS equipment periodically and after personnel changes. Note that products with no support for enforcement of unique passwords over time should be compensated for with policies and procedures that require a history of unique passwords.

Recommendations on password complexity and management can be found in NIST 800-118, Guide to Enterprise Password Management.

# 4.4 Password Management

As described in Section 4.2.1, Authorization Framework, each instance of a server has its own instances of the predefined subjects. As a result, passwords for each subject must be separately managed for each instance of a given kind of server.

## 4.4.1 Changing Passwords

**Table 5**

| Functionality | Authenticated Subjects | How Passwords are assigned |
|---|---|---|
| Firmware Update | PRIV Level 4 user | Static login and password |
| Web Server Firmware Update | Firmware Updater | Via Web Server Reset Password webpages. 8-16 characters: At least one lower case letter At least one upper case letter At least one number (0-9) At least one special character: !"#%&’()*+,-./:;< = >?@[\]^_`{ }~ |

# 4.5 Confidentiality and Integrity

## 4.5.1 Communication Protocols

Some communications protocols provide features that help protect data while it is in flight

– actively moving through a network. The most common of these features include:

- Encryption: Protects the confidentiality of the data being transmitted.

- Message Authentication Codes: Ensures message authenticity and integrity by cryptographically detecting message tampering or forgery. This ensures the data originated from the expected source and was not altered since it was transmitted, regardless of whether it was malicious.

Currently, only the Web Page Reset Password HTTPS communications provides Encryption. None of other the communications protocols supported by PROFINET I/O Devices provide either of these features, as detailed in the table below. Therefore, compensating controls may be required to meet an installation's security requirements for protecting data in-flight.

## Protocol-Provided Security Capabilities

**Table 6**

| Transport Medium | Protocol | Data Encryption | Message Authentication Codes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ETHERNET | DCE/RPC | N | N |
| | HTTP | N | N |
| | HTTPS | Y | N |
| | PROFINET DCP | N | N |
| | PROFINET I/O | N | N |
| | MRP | N | N |
| Serial | SNP Slave | N | N |

## 4.5.2    Firmware Signatures

Some PROFINET I/O Devices supplied by Emerson may have digitally signed firmware images to provide cryptographic assurance of the firmware's integrity. For PROFINET I/O Devices that support this feature, a digital signature is used to verify that any firmware being loaded onto the module was supplied by the General Electric Company and has not been modified. If the digital signature validation fails, the new firmware will not be installed onto the device.

## 4.5.3    Logging and Auditing

PROFINET I/O Devices supplied by Emerson do not provide a dedicated security log embedded within the module, nor do they integrate with an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system.

# Chapter 5:   Configuration Hardening

This section is intended to assist in reducing the potential attack surface by providing information that can be used to harden the configuration of the PROFINET I/O Devices that are present in an installation. Configuration Hardening should be considered in addition to enabling and using security features such as Authentication, Access Control, and Authorization.

Emerson recommends disabling, on each PROFINET I/O Device, all ports, services, and protocols that are not required for the intended application.

## 5.1      Scanner

This section provides information to use when hardening the configuration of a PROFINET I/O Device Scanner or it's DAP (Device Access Point). These options should be considered when configuring any PROFINET I/O Device that supports them.

**Table 7**

| Service | How to Disable |
| --- | --- |
| IP Routing | Set *Gateway IP Address* to 0.0.0.0 in the hardware configuration and download to the PROFINET I/O controller. |
| Ethernet Port Enable | Set Port Speed of Port submodule to Disabled in the hardware configuration and download to the PROFINET I/O controller. This will prevent the port from powering up and establishing a link. This setting is retained over a power cycle. |
| SD Card Identity | Set the name of the Device using a DCP Client with the SD Card inserted. Remove SD Card and enable the physical Write-Protect feature on the SD Card. Re-insert the SD Card in the Scanner. This will prevent future attempts to rename the Scanner from persisting over a power cycle. |
| Front Panel Ethernet Port | Set IP Address, Subnet Mask, and Gateway IP Address to 0.0.0.0 in the hardware configuration and download to the PROFINET I/O Controller. No Web Server access or firmware update functionality will be available through the front panel Ethernet port. |
| Firmware Update During RUN Mode | Clear the control bit to disable firmware updates while the unit is connected to a PROFINET IO Controller that is in RUN mode. Applies to IC695PNS001-BAxx and IC695PNS101 only. |

# 5.2 Genius Gateway

This section provides information to use when hardening the configuration of and access to a Genius Communications Gateway.

**Table 8**

| Service | How to Disable |
|---|---|
| IP Routing | Set *Gateway IP Address* to 0.0.0.0 in the hardware configuration and download to the PROFINET I/O controller. |
| SD Card Identity | Set the name of the Device using a DCP Client with the SD Card inserted. Remove SD Card and enable the physical Write-protect feature on the SD Card. Re-insert the SD Card in the Gateway. This will prevent future attempts to rename the Scanner from persisting over a power cycle. |
| Physical Access | Restrict physical access to the rear of the Gateway. Consider the use of secure screws when mounting the Gateway. This will prevent future attempts to perform an unauthorized firmware upgrade by restricting access to the SD card and the firmware upgrade pushbutton. |

# Chapter 6: Network Architecture and Secure Deployment

This section provides security recommendations for deploying PROFINET I/O Devices from Emerson in the context of a larger network.

## 6.1    Reference Architecture

The Figure 1 shows a reference deployment of components supplied by Emerson.

**Figure 1: Reference Architecture**

The Manufacturing Zone networks (which include the Manufacturing Operations, Supervisory Control, and Process Control networks) are segregated from other untrusted networks such as the enterprise network (also referred to as the business network, corporate network, or intranet) and the internet using a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) architecture. The Process Control networks have limited exposure to traffic from higher-level networks, including other networks in the Manufacturing Zone, as well as from other Process Control networks.

# 6.2 Remote Access and Demilitarized Zones

A Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) architecture uses two firewalls to isolate servers that are accessible from untrusted networks. The DMZ should be deployed such that only specific (restricted) communication is allowed between the business network and the DMZ, and between the control network and the DMZ. The business network and the control networks should ideally not communicate directly with each other.

If direct communication to a control network is required from the business network or from the internet, carefully control, limit and monitor all access. For example, require two factor authentications for a user to obtain access to the control network using Virtual Private Networking (VPN) and even then, restrict the allowed protocols/ports to just the minimum set required. Further, every access attempt (successful or not) and all blocked traffic should be recorded in a security log that is regularly audited.

# 6.3 Access and Process Control Networks

Ethernet traffic from the Supervisory Control network to the Process Control networks should be restricted to support only the functionality that is required. For example, since PACSystems Machine Edition uses SRTP to download the application to the PACSystems controllers and NIUs, then SRTP traffic must be allowed through the firewall. However, if a protocol (such as Modbus TCP) does not need to be used between those regions, then the firewall should be configured to block that protocol. If, in addition to that, a controller does not have some other reason it needs to use that protocol, then – in addition to blocking it at the firewall – the controller itself should be configured to disable support for the protocol.

> *Note:* *Network Address Translation (NAT) firewalls typically do not expose all the devices on the trusted side of the firewall to devices on the untrusted side of the firewall. Further, NAT firewalls rely on mapping the IP address/port on the trusted side of the firewall to a different IP address/port on the untrusted side of the firewall. Since communication to PACSystems controllers will typically be initiated from a computer on the untrusted side of the Process Control network firewall, protecting a Process Control network using a NAT firewall may cause additional communication challenges. Before deploying NAT, carefully consider its impact on the required communications paths.*

# 6.4       Access and PROFINET Networks

Commissioning and maintaining the devices on the PROFINET network requires the ability to communicate from a computer to the I/O devices on that network. For example, if a PROFINET I/O device fails and needs to be replaced, the replacement I/O device will need to be assigned a name. As described in 3.5 PROFINET, this can be done using the PROFINET DCP protocol. However, to help ensure that the Maintenance computer cannot be used to launch attacks on the I/O devices using other protocols, the firewall it connects through should block all protocols that are not needed for performing the maintenance functions.

> *Note:*      *Since the PROFINET DCP protocol is not routable, the firewall used will most likely need to be configured so it operates in Transparent mode. This will allow the Maintenance computer to be part of the same subnet as the PROFINET I/O devices, as required by the PROFINET DCP protocol. Transparent mode is noted using a T on the firewall in the Reference Architecture diagram (Figure 1).*

# Chapter 7:   Other Considerations

## 7.1       Patch Management

A strategy for applying security fixes, including patches, firmware updates, and configuration changes, should be included in a facility's security plan. Applying these updates will often require that an affected PROFINET I/O Device be temporarily taken out of service.

Some installations require extensive qualification be performed before changes are deployed to the production environment. While this requirement is independent of security, ensuring the ability to promptly apply security fixes while minimizing downtime may drive the need for additional infrastructure to help with this qualification.

## 7.2       Real-time Communication

When designing the network architecture, it is important to understand what impact the network protection devices (such as firewalls) will have on the real-time characteristics of the communications traffic that must pass through them. In particular, the PROFINET I/O protocol is generally expected to operate with small, known, worst-case bounds on its communications latency and jitter. As a result, network architectures that require real-time communications to pass through such devices may limit the applications that can be successfully deployed.

## 7.3       Additional Guidance

### 7.3.1     Protocol-Specific Guidance

Protocol standards bodies may publish guidance on how to securely deploy and use their protocols. Such documentation, when available, should be considered in addition to this document. This includes, but is not limited to the following document:

PROFINET Security Guideline (TC3-04-0004a) by PROFIBUS INTERNATIONAL

### 7.3.2     Government Agencies and Standards Organizations

Government agencies and international standards organizations may provide guidance on creating and maintaining a robust security program, including how to securely deploy and use Control Systems. For example, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has published guidance on Secure Architecture Design and on Recommended Practices for cybersecurity with Control Systems. Such documentation, when appropriate, should be considered in addition to this document. Similarly, the International Society of Automation publishes the ISA-99 specifications to provide guidance on establishing and operating a cybersecurity program, including recommended technologies for industrial automation and control systems.

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